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Abstract 
Aghion, P. and P. Bolton (1997, "A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and Development," Review of Economic 
Studies, 59, 151-172) provide a model analyzing the effect of capital accumulation on income inequality. We integrate 
two additional features to a modified version of this model. The first one is a costly financial contract enforcement 
which represents the second type of credit market imperfection in addition to moral hazard. The second one is 
enabling wealthy agents to undertake larger investment projects relatively to other agents. I show that inequality 
increases in a first stage of development and, contrarily to Aghion and Bolton (1997), remains constant or increases in 
a second stage (depending on the deposit interest rate ceiling).
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     1. Introduction
This paper investigates the relationship between inequality and capital accumulation
in the presence of credit market imperfection which reﬂects among others the weakness of
the judicial institutions. For the banking system, which still dominates the ﬁnancial sys-
tem of most developing countries, the legal framework is particularly important. Indeed,
in case of borrower’s default the bank often has the right to seize collateral. However, the
implementation of this right in practice depends on the eﬃciency of the judicial system.
If the judicial system is weak, banks are willing to ﬁnance only entrepreneurs provid-
ing suﬃcient collateral. Considering 56 countries over the period 2002-04, regressing the
entrepreneurship density on judicial eﬃciency we found positive and highly signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient (t-statistic, 5.18) and R2 of 0.20 (ﬁgure 1).
An increase of the judicial eﬃciency of 1 is associated, on average, with a 18.83
per mil increase in the entrepreneurship density. This is a large quantitative eﬀect which
signiﬁes that an economy may suﬀer from low entrepreneurship due to the weakness of its
judicial system. A possible explanation of this positive relationship between the judicial
eﬃciency and the entrepreneurship is credit rationing. Credit rationing may accentuate
the income inequality in a given economy. In deed, as mentioned by Banerjee and Duﬂo
(2005) “two ﬁrms facing the exact same technological options may end up choosing very
diﬀerent methods of production. In particular, one person may start a large or more
technologically advanced ﬁrm because he has money and another may start a small and
backward one because he does not”. As a consequence, banks will compete to lend for
the wealthy entrepreneurs which become highly leveraged and need more monitoring. As
noted by Banerjee and Duﬂo (2005) this may leads to a high cost of monitoring, low
interest rate for savers and higher returns for entrepreneurs which increases the income
inequalities. In order to investigate this relationship we regressed the GINI index on the
Judicial Eﬃciency (JE) over the period 1999-2001 for 42 countries. As shown in ﬁgure
2, an increase of the judicial eﬃciency reduces the inequality captured through the GINI
index.
Many papers (e.g. Bertola (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini
(1994), Perotti (1996)) revealed that inequality is negatively associated with growth. Re-
cently, Banerjee and Duﬂo (2005) presented empirical evidence that the growth is an
inverted U— curve of inequality. However, the eﬀect of credit market imperfection (here
judicial ineﬃciency) on the relationship between inequality and capital accumulation was
rarely analyzed in a theoretical model. Galor and Moav (2004) analyze the eﬀect of
income inequality on the development process and distinguish three stages. In the ﬁrst
stage, inequality enhances the process of development by channeling resources towards
individuals endowed with higher marginal propensity to save. In the second stage of
development, inequality reduces the investment in human capital and lowers economic
growth, in the presence of credit constraints. Finally in a third stage, credit constraints
become less binding and the aggregate eﬀect of income distribution on the growth pro-
cess becomes less signiﬁcant. Aghion and Bolton (1997) is the departure model of our
research. They developed a theoretical model analyzing the relation between inequality
and development when banks face a moral hazard problem when ﬁnancing entrepreneurs.
They showed that the capital accumulation process begins by widening the inequalities
but reduces them in later stages.
Departing from Aghion and Bolton (1997) I integrate two additional features that
change their results about the relationship between capital accumulation and inequality.
1The ﬁrst feature is including a costly contract enforcement (judicial ineﬃciency) as a
second type of credit market imperfection in addition to moral hazard. The second
feature is enabling, contrarily to Aghion and Bolton (1997), wealthy agents to undertake
larger projects which is coherent with the above cited intuition of Banerjee and Duﬂo
(2005). I show that inequality increases in a ﬁrst stage of development and, contrarily to
Aghion and Bolton (1997), remains constant or increases in a second stage (depending
on the deposit interest rate ceiling).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
framework. Section 3 and 4 analyze the optimal lending contract and the occupational
choice respectively. I investigate the evolution of the wealth inequality in section 5.
Finally, section 5 concludes.
2. Model
The economy is closed and contains a sequence of one-period-lived overlapping gen-
erations. An initial generation of old entrepreneurs coexists with young agents at date
t =0 . Each generation is composed of a continuum of mass 1 agents indexed by i.E a c h
agent has one oﬀspring and works or invests. Agents are risk-neutral and their utility
depends only on consumption and bequest. Hence, an agent divides the income he re-
ceives between consumption and bequest. The only source of heterogeneity among agents
is their inherited wealth wi
t. Each agent i is endowed with one unit of eﬀort (li =1 ). He
may choose to undertake a project requiring a minimum ﬁxed investment of e w>1 that




awi with probability pi
0 with probability 1 − pi
where a ∈ ]1,2[ and pi = li denotes the probability of success which is equal to 1 if
the agent supplies his entire eﬀort. We assume that there is an eﬀort cost C(li)=ah w
2 (li)
2.
The chronology of an agent’s decisions in his life is shown by the following graphic:
At the beginning of its life the agent decides the eﬀort to supply and how to invest his
inherited wealth wi
t. At the end of its lifetime, the individual allocates his net ﬁnal wealth
between consumption and bequest. As in Aghion and Bolton (1997) agents are assumed to
have Leontieﬀ preferences over consumption and bequest. Therefore, the optimal bequest
is a linear function of end of period wealth wi
t+ and is given by bi
t+1 = wi
t+1 =( 1− δ)wi
t+
where 1 − δ is the saving propensity of individuals.
We assume that at date t =0 , a proportion π of the young agents has a low inherited
wealth w0 < e w (resulting from the initial old generation’s bequests) and constitutes the
class i = l. The remainder proportion 1 − π has a high inherited wealth e w>w0 and
constitutes the class i = h. An agent of the class i = l,h born at date t ≥ 0 with
2an initial wealth wi
t such that wi
t ≥ e w could self-ﬁnance his project but may have an
incentive to ask for a bank loan in order to enlarge it. The self-ﬁnancing capital is
considered as collateral for the bank and wealthy agents may be more likely to obtain a
loan. Even if his project succeeds, an agent may have an incentive to default on the loan.
In this case, the bank seizes a fraction λ ∈ [1
2,1] of the produced output. The unseized
fraction 1 − λ corresponds to an enforcing repayment cost which could be interpreted as
the ineﬃciency’s level of the judicial system. An agent with an inherited wealth wi
t ≤ e w
who is unable to obtain a loan has no choice but depositing his wealth in the bank in
return of a certain (gross) return 1 ≤ rd
t ≤ a.
3. Optimal lending contract
An agent of class i can self-ﬁnance a project if his inherited wealth wi
t is superior to
the minimum ﬁxed investment e w. He may also ask for a bank loan di
t for an additional
investment. As in Aghion and Bolton (1997) since the incentive problem is a moral hazard
problem with limited wealth constraints, an optimal investment contract between this
agent and the bank speciﬁes the repayment schedule Ri








t with probability pi
t
0 with probability 1 − pi
t
where ri
t is the unit repayment rate. In order to prevent the borrower’s default, the
r e p a y m e n ts h o u l db ea tm o s te q u a lt ot h ed e f a u l t ’ sc o s t .T h ed e f a u l tc o s ti se q u a lt o
t h eo u t p u tt h eb a n ks e i z e si nc a s eo fs u c c e s so ft h ep r o j e c tw h i c hi sλa(wi
t + di
t). Hence,
we should impose Ri
t ≤ λa(wi
t + di














Since the unit repayment rate ri
t the borrower chooses the eﬀort li to supply and the
amount of loan di
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Given that the economy comprises at each date t a continuum of agents belonging to
the two classes (the class of low inheriting wealth and the high inheriting one) and that the
random returns on each risky project are independently and identically distributed the
proportion of successful projects is pi for the class i. Hence, the return of the bank could
be interpreted as deterministic and is given by piri
t. Assuming a competitive banking
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t h w λa] if
rd
t












e w − wi





























Proof. See the appendix.
It is easy to see from (3) that the lower the entrepreneur’s self-ﬁnancing wi
t the less
eﬀort he devotes to increase the probability of success of his project when his wealth
is inferior to the threshold wrt.P a r t i c u l a r l y ,t h em a s sπ of agents having low inherited
wealth wl
t will have less incentive to supply eﬀort compared to the class of mass 1 − π
having high inherited wealth wh
t . Consequently, (as shown in the equation (19) of the
Annex), the unit repayment is higher for the low wealthy class of agents rl
t >r h
t when
their initial endowment is inferior to a determined threshold wrt.T h i si sa l s od u et ot h e
high amount of loan they need in order to undertake the project e w−wl
t > e w−wh
t .W h e n
their wealth is suﬃciently high (superior to wrt) they support the same unit repayment
cost. However, the maximum amount of loan they obtain is always inferior to that of the




Let b wt denotes the initial wealth endowment of an agent of generation t who is indif-
ferent between undertaking a project and depositing his wealth in a bank. Hence, only
t h ea g e n t sw i t ha ni n i t i a le n d o w m e n twt < b wt prefer strictly becoming depositors. Those
with wt > b wt prefer becoming entrepreneurs. The threshold b wt is determined by the
condition pt[a(b wt + dt) − rtdt] − C(lt)=rd
t b wt which could be written using ptrt = rd
t as
following
pta(b wt + dt)=r
d






i) The threshold b wt exists for rd







rλ ∈ ]max(1,λa),a[ veriﬁes
∂rλ
∂λ > 0 and is solution of the equation:
2λ(1 − λ)[(
rλ
a ) − λ]/[1 − (
rλ
















5. Wealth dynamic and inequality
Proposition 2
The wealth inequality widens between the two classes of agents in a ﬁrst stage of
development. Outside, it remains constant or widens depending on the deposit interest
rate ceiling.
Proof. The dynamic of wealth accumulation is given by
w
i
t+1 =( 1− δ)w
i
t+
where δ ∈ ]0,1[ is the consumption fraction and wi
t+ t h ew e a l t ho fa na g e n ti at the end
of his life. When the agent is a depositor we have wi
t+ = rd
twi
t. If he is an entrepreneur
wi









t with probability pi
t
0 with probability 1 − pi
t
From lemma 1 it is clear that ∂ b wt/∂rd
t > 0 and the limit of b wt is +∞ when rd
t tends to
a. Hence, when the initial wealth of the low-inheriting agent wl
t is strictly inferior to that
of the high-inheriting agent wh
t there exists always a value of rd
t such that wl
t ≤ b wt <w h
t
making the low inheriting agents always preferring depositing and the high inheriting
agent preferring undertaking a project. Hence, even if the low inheriting agents could
self-ﬁnance their project (wl
t > e w) there exists a deposit interest rate such that wl
t < b wt
making them preferring depositing their wealth in a bank. Besides, note that a high
inheriting agent who couldn’t self-ﬁnance a project (wh
t < e w)c o u l db er a t i o n e d .T h i s
occurs if the total saving collected from the low-inheriting agents is not suﬃcient to
satisfy the total demand of loan by the wealthy class of agents:
πw
l
t < (1 − π)
¡









t + φ(1 − π)w
h
t =( 1− φ)(1 − π)
¡













t =( 1 − π)w
h
t

































where (1 − φ)(1 − π)ph
t represents the proportion of entrepreneurs with successful






































































Hence, the wealth inequality between the two types of agents increases from period t
to period t +1 . The last inequality results from the fact that for agents h undertaking







t . Note that if
the credit rationing disappears (ie (6) is no more veriﬁed) we have to replace φ by zero
in the above dynamic.
Let’s now analyse the case where the deposit interest rate ceiling is strictly inferior to
a and is given by r ∈ ]λa,r0
λ[ where r0
λ is deﬁned in lemma 1 . In this case, the threshold b wt
deﬁned in lemma 1 couldn’t exceed b w = a(r − λa) e w/(2(a − r)r) < e w. Therefore, when
the wealth of the two types of agents exceeds the threshold b w they will prefer strictly
becoming entrepreneurs. In this case, the credit rationing is equally faced by the two
categories of agents if their initial endowment wi
t is strictly inferior to e w and we obtain
w
l













































0 the probability of an agent to be credit rationed is deﬁned by the equality






























































































Comparing (7) and (9) it is clear that the dynamic of wealth inequality is slower in
the case where the deposit interest ceiling is r rather then a. Moreover, from proposition










t ≥ wr = 1
4
r h w
λ(1−λ)a. In this region, we conclude
from (8) that the wealth inequality remains constant. This result remains when wi
t > e w
since we could straightforwardly show that pi
t =1and wi
t+1 = a(1 − δ)wi
t.
6. Conclusion
Departing from Aghion and Bolton (1997) I integrate new features that modify their
results about the relationship between capital accumulation and inequality. The ﬁrst
feature is including a costly contract enforcement as a second type of credit market
imperfection in addition to the moral hazard problem between banks and borrowers.
The second feature is enabling, contrarily to Aghion and Bolton (1997), wealthy agents
to undertake larger investment projects. Our results show that inequality increases in a
ﬁrst stage of development and, contrarily to Aghion and Bolton (1997), remains constant
or widens in a second stage.
.
7Appendix
Figure 1: Judicial eﬃciency and entrepreneurship density
Source: I used the entrepreneurship density from the World Bank Group
Entrepreneurship Database (2007) and the judicial efficiency index
of Laeven and Majnoni (2005).
.
Figure 2:T h ej u d i c i a le ﬃciency and the GINI index
Source: I used the judicial efficiency index of Laeven and Majnoni (2005)
and the GINI index from the WDI.
8Table 1. The Judicial eﬃciency and Entrepreneurship Density data.
9Table 2. The Judicial eﬃciency and GINI index.
10P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1









































t − e w
¢
Applying the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem the ﬁrst-order conditions are
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨











∂µi ≥ 0,µ i∗ ≥ 0
∂L
∂γi ≥ 0,γ i∗ ≥ 0
with complementary slackness in each of the three last conditions.
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
[a(wi
t + di∗
t ) − ri
tdi∗
t ] − ae wli∗ − µi∗ =0
li∗ [a − ri
t] − β






1 − li∗ ≥ 0,µ i∗ ≥ 0
wi
t + di
t ≥ e w, γi∗ ≥ 0
Case of the variable di∗
t > 0
Then li∗ [a − ri
t]+γi∗ = β
i∗.












• If γi∗ =0then a = ri
t.
• If γi∗ > 0 then wi
t+di∗
t = e w.F r o m( 1 0 )w en e e dt oh a v eri
t >aa n dw es h o u l dv e r i f y
that di∗
t = e w − wi
t < di

























i∗ + a (11)
• If γi∗ =0then the condition (11) becomes ri
t ≤ a and we should verify that
wi
t + di
t ≥ e w which is the case if wi
t ≥ wi
1t.
• If γi∗ > 0 then wi
t + di
t = e w which is the case if wi
t = wi
1t.
11Case of the variable µi∗ > 0












− ae w>0 (12)
Subcase di∗
t = di






















• If γi∗ =0Then a = ri
t and (12) becomes wi
t > e w
• If γi∗ > 0 then di∗
t = e w−wi
t. The condition (12) becomes wi
t > e w which is impossible
since it leads to di∗
t < 0.
Subcase di∗
t =0 Condition (12) becomes wi
t > e w .













t Condition (14) becomes wi
t ≤ wi
2t.
Subcase 0 <d i∗
t < di
t
• If γi∗ =0then ri
t = a and wi
t ≤ e w.
• If γi∗ > 0 then di∗
t = e w − wi
t. Condition (14) is veriﬁed when wi
t ≤ e w.
Subcase di∗
t =0 Condition (14) becomes wi
t ≤ e w which is possible just when wi
t = e w
the minimum required investment for undertaking the project.
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t ≤ e w
1 if wi



























e w − wi
t if wi
1t ≤ wi
t ≤ e w
0 if wi
























S i n c ew eh a v erd
t = piri




t [ae w − ri
t (e w − wi
t)] = ae wrd
t if wi
1t ≤ wi























Let’s consider the ﬁrst equation of the system (15) ri
t [ae w − ri
t (e w − wi




t ≤ e w and ri
t >a .I tc a nb es e e na sas e c o n dd e g r e ee q u a t i o ni nri























Which is equivalent to
w
i





























t ≤ λ which is veriﬁed only if
w
i








It is simple to show that the condition ri




a e w. Hence the















t ≤ a.It can also be seen as a
second degree equation in ri






















t h w λa ≥ 0
13which is equivalent to
w
i





















t−λa) ≤ 1 or rd
t ≤ ri









e w ≤ w
i
t (18)
It is straightforward to show that this condition is veriﬁed for
rd
t
a e w ≤ wi
t ≤ wrt. Indeed,
s i n c ew ea r ei nt h ec a s eo fri




< 1 − λ ≤ 1
2. Besides, rd
t ≥ 1 > a
2 because




a e w and the condition (18) is veriﬁed. The ﬁnal condition
ri




a e w. Hence the solution (17) is verﬁed for
e w ≤ w
i
t ≤ wrt
Finally the third equation of the system (15) becomes ri
t = rd
t and wi





Finally noting that wpt <w rt and in order to limit the discontinuity of ri
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rd
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λ(1−λ)a. Using the equality rd
t = piri
t the rest of
the proof is straightforward.
P r o o fo fl e m m a1
From proposition 1 we can distinguish two cases
• If b wt ≤ wrt then di










a which is not possible since the second term of the equation is
strictly negative (2/a ∈ ]1,2[ and since rd
t ≥ 1 then 2rd
t/a > 1).
• If b wt >w rt then di
t = di
t = λab wt/(rd












t]. Now, we should determine the condition on rd
t in
order to have b wt >w rt = wrt = 1
4rd
t e w/[λ(1 − λ)a]. After some algebra we obtain
the following condition 2λ(1 − λ)[(
rd
t
a ) − λ]/[1 − (
rd
t
a )] > (
rd
t
a )2. Therfore, we can






t ∈ ]rλ,a[ where
rλ ∈ ]1,a[ veriﬁes
∂rλ
∂λ > 0 and 2λ(1 − λ)[(
rλ
a ) − λ]/[1 − (
rλ
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